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Abstract—The goal of this work is to demonstrate the use of
the ballistocardiogram (BCG) signal, derived using head-mounted
wearable devices, as a viable biometric for authentication. The
BCG signal is the measure of an person’s body acceleration as
a result of the heart’s ejection of blood. It is a characterization
of the cardiac cycle and can be derived non-invasively from the
measurement of subtle movements of a person’s extremities. In
this paper, we use several versions of the BCG signal, derived
from accelerometer and gyroscope sensors on a Smart Eyewear
(SEW) device, for authentication. The derived BCG signals are
used to train a convolutional neural network (CNN) as an
authentication model, which is personalized for each subject. We
evaluate our authentication models using data from 12 subjects
and show that our approach has an equal error rate (EER) of
3.5% immediately after training and 13% after about 2 months,
in the worst case. We also explore the use of our authentication
approach for people with motor disabilities. Our analysis using
a separate dataset of 6 subjects with non-spastic cerebral palsy
shows an EER of 11.2% immediately after training and 21.6%
after about 2 months, in the worst-case.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an explosion in the prolifera-
tion of head-mounted wearable devices, with products such as
smart eyewear (SEW) devices [1], [2], [3], [6], smart ear-buds
[13], and smart headwear [4]. Most of these devices come with
in-built accelerometer and gyroscope sensors, which can mea-
sure a variety of the wearer’s head and body movements. One
of the potential uses of such head-mounted wearable devices is
to provide new sources of biometrics for authentication [17].
Our principal goal in this paper is to develop a passive
authentication approach using head-mounted wearable devices
(i.e., it works without requiring explicit action or gestures of
any kind from the wearer). Passive authentication approaches
are more difficult for adversaries to copy and spoof. Physio-
logical signals (e.g., electroencephalogram (EEG)) make good
biometrics for enabling passive authentication due to their
inherently limited observability for adversaries. Our strategy
is to use measurements from the two movement sensors
(i.e., accelerometer and gyroscope) on head-mounted wearable
devices and use them to derive something called a ballisto-
cardiogram (BCG). BCG represents the body’s motion as the
blood flows through it, in response to the beating of the heart,
and thus captures the characteristics of the cardiac cycle [8].
We derive the BCG used for authentication by asking each
subject to sit still and then capturing and filtering the subtle
and involuntary1 head movements that their body makes as a
result of the pumping action of the heart. In fact we divide the
sensor measurements into fixed-duration segments and derive
six versions of BCG (which we refer to as BCG waveforms),
one for each axis of the accelerometer and gyroscope, from
each segment.
The BCG waveforms from several segments are then used to
train a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) classifier, which
acts as the authentication model. Each authentication model is
subject-specific (i.e., personalized), therefore different subjects
have their own models. Once the models are trained, authen-
tication is done by collecting one (or more) segment(s) of
accelerometer and gyroscope measurements from an unknown
subject wearing the head-mounted wearable device. The sensor
measurements in the segment are filtered to derive six BCG
waveforms, which are then fed into a subject-specific model
(belonging to the subject in our system that the unknown
subject claims to be). This model determines if these newly
derived BCG waveforms are similar to the waveforms already
seen from the subject earlier during model training. If deemed
sufficiently similar, the unknown subject is then successfully
authenticated. We evaluate our authentication models using
data from 12 subjects. Our approach demonstrated an equal
error rate of 3.5% immediately after training and 13% after
about 2 months, in the worst case.
In addition, we also explore the use of our approach for
subjects with motor disabilities. The idea was to see if it
can provide an easy-to-use authentication alternative for a
population that lacks full independence in using their com-
puting devices securely. People with motor disabilities have
tremendous difficulty existing authentication solutions (e.g.,
1Here, we use the term involuntary in the medical sense to mean not under
the conscious control of a person [5].
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passwords, fingerprint), to the extent that they have to rely on
others to authenticate for them [15]. Using a separate dataset
of 6 subjects with non-spastic cerebral palsy, our approach
demonstrated a worst-case equal error rate of 11.2% after
training and 21.6% after about 2 months.
In this paper, we specifically use a Smart Eyewear (SEW)
device (Google Glass [2]) as our head-mounted wearable
device. We chose to use an SEW device because of its relative
ubiquity and easy programmability compared to other head-
mounted wearable devices. Note that our work is generalizable
to any head-mounted wearable device and is in no way limited
to SEW devices or to Google Glass.
The contributions of this paper are then three-fold. (a) A
passive authentication approach that uses BCG derived from
accelerometer and gyroscope measurements of subtle and in-
voluntary head movements. (b) Demonstration of the viability
of this authentication approach measurements collected from
12 able-bodied subjects over the course of approximately 3
months. (c) Demonstration of the promise of our authentication
approach for people with motor disabilities, using measure-
ments from 6 subjects with cerebral palsy over approximately
3 months.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We next detail our problem statement and the assumed threat
model for this work. The principal problem that we address
in this paper is to determine if ballistocardiogram derived
from subtle head movements of a person wearing an SEW
device (or more generally, a head-mounted wearable device)
is capable of authenticating them. We assume that the threat
to our authentication approach comes from adversaries trying
to declare themselves to be a particular subject (i.e., victim)
and try to mimic their head movements to try to authenticate
successfully. For the purposes of this work, we assume that
adversaries: (1) do not have access to the authentication model,
(2) cannot pollute the model during the training stage, and (3)
do not have access to any form of cardiac signal from the
victim’s past or present.
III. APPROACH
Our authentication approach has four stages. Data collection
and preprocessing describes our process for gathering the
accelerometer and gyroscope measurements from the SEW
device followed by a preprocess step to synchronize them.
BCG extraction shows the derivation of BCG from the head
movement data. Model training uses the derived BCG to
train a convolutional neural network (CNN) classifier as the
authentication model. Finally, the authentication process itself
uses the trained CNN classifier to authenticate the subject.
A. Data Collection Protocol
The first stage in our authentication approach is to collect
accelerometer and gyroscope measurements from subjects
wearing the SEW device (a Google Glass in our case). We
standardize the data collection protocol across the subjects
to minimize motion artifacts and to ensure reproducibility of
results. The data collection protocol used is as follows. We
ask the subjects to sit comfortably, upright, and still. Their
hands are placed on a table with their elbows forming a 90-
degree angle. We then situate an SEW device on their faces
such that the upper edge of the device aligns with their brow.
We make sure that the device fits comfortably (not pinching
or sitting unevenly) on the subjects’ heads. Subjects wearing
prescription glasses are asked to remove them to minimize
SEW fitting issues.
B. Data Preprocessing
During data collection, the accelerometer and gyroscope
sensors in the SEW device are set to sample at 50 Hz.
The SEW device relays measurements from the accelerom-
eter/gyroscope sensors wirelessly to a nearby laptop, where
the measurements are stored. As a result of the data collection
process, we obtain six discrete, raw sensor streams: the three
axes of the accelerometer and three axes of the gyroscope
measurements. Sensor data from any Android device, like
Google Glass, is not guaranteed to align exactly to a par-
ticular sampling rate. Therefore, a sampling rate of 50Hz
resulted in an inter-sample-interval of anywhere from 5 to
20 ms. Additionally, there exists no guarantee that the samples
recorded from the gyroscope and accelerometer measurements
are synchronized or aligned in any way. In order to address
these two concerns, we preprocess the sensor streams. In
this regard, once the raw sensor streams are collected, we
truncate the beginnings and endings of both the gyroscope
and accelerometer measurements, such that the timestamp of
the first and last samples of both sensor measurements are as
close as possible. We then interpolate the data and align the
samples with one another. The first sample of the gyroscope
and the accelerometer now share the same timestamp, as do
all the subsequent points in the sensor stream. All subsequent
analyses use these preprocessed sensor streams instead of the
raw sensor streams.
C. Deriving the BCG Waveform
Once we obtain the preprocessed sensor streams of ac-
celerometer and gyroscope measurements from individual sub-
jects, the next step in our approach is to derive the BCG.
To do this, we first divide each preprocessed sensor stream
into overlapped segments of size w seconds. Between two
sequential segments, there is a w − 1 second overlap. Hence,
two segments with w = 3 seconds would share 2 seconds
of data. Then, inspired by [9], we perform a three-step BCG
derivation process. (1) Normalization: We normalize each of
the six sensor streams to have a zero mean and unit variance
within each segment. (2) Rolling Average Filter: We then
subtract a rolling-average filter of 35 samples from each sensor
stream to correct for large motions as well as gyroscope and
accelerometer drift. (3) Band-Pass Filter: Finally, we apply a
4th-order band-pass Butterworth filter with cutoff frequencies
at 4 and 11Hz to each sensor stream. Figure 1 shows the main
stages of BCG generation for one segment of a sensor stream.
In all, we derive six versions of BCG (i.e., BCG waveforms),
Band-Pass FilterNormalization Rolling Average
Fig. 1: The process of generating a BCG waveform from a segment of preprocessed x-axis gyroscope sensor stream.
This process is performed on all three axes of accelerometer and gyroscope sensors.
one per axis of accelerometer and gyroscope, per segment.
These six BCG waveforms are then used as input for our
authentication model.
D. Model Training and Authentication
We now construct an authentication model that learns the
features of each subject’s BCG waveforms and use their
uniqueness to authenticate the subject at a later time. We
use a convolutional neural network (CNN)-based classifier
as our authentication model. We use CNNs due to their
demonstrated ability to effectively classify time-series such
as electrocardiogram (ECG), which, like BCG waveforms, are
representations of the cardiac rhythm [18]. In particular, our
authentication approach has two stages, the training stage and
the authentication stage.
Training Stage: During the training stage, the goal is to
enroll the subject into the authentication system by training a
subject-specific authentication model for them. This requires
the collection of accelerometer/gyroscope measurements from
a subject wearing the SEW device for ∆E time-units. We
use the 6 BCG waveforms from ∆/w segments (obtained
from the subjects in our dataset (see Section IV-A)) to train a
CNN-based classifier as an authentication model for a subject.
During the training, we label the BCG waveforms from the
subject’s own segments as belonging to the positive class,
while we consider the BCG waveforms from other subjects
in out dataset to be part of the negative class. As such we
use a one-versus-all strategy that allows each subject to get a
custom, subject-specific model.
In our CNN setup, the network has a particular emphasis on
the relationships between the three axes of accelerometer- and
gyroscope-derived BCG waveforms. To this end, we rearrange
each w segment to form a 2× 3× (w× 50) tensor to be used
as input to the CNN. Here, the first dimension refers to the
measurement source (accelerometer or gyroscope), the second
refers to the axis, and the third refers to time (where 50 is the
sampling frequency in Hz). In designing our CNN we only
fixed the inputs and outputs. As an output, the final layer is
expressed as a single neuron reporting a value between 0.0
and 1.0, indicating the confidence of the CNN that the given
sample should be accepted as belonging to the subject. In order
to determine the intermediate layers of this CNN and their
parameters, we take a genetic algorithm-based approach. More
details on the algorithm are given in Section IV-C. Figure 2
shows the final topology of the CNN we ultimately use. We
train the CNN over the course of 100 epochs, at which point
the loss of the model stabilizes to a minimum. At this point, the
model has been trained and is ready to perform authentication.
Authentication Stage: Once the model is trained, it is capa-
ble of performing authentication. To authenticate an unknown
individual, we collect one (or more) w-second segment of
raw accelerometer and gyroscope measurements while the
unknown individual is wearing the SEW device. We derive
BCG waveforms for each segment. These BCG waveforms are
fed into the CNN of the authentication model, which produces
a confidence score pertaining to how strongly it believes that
the unknown individual is the same as the subject for whom
the model was trained. If this confidence score is greater than
a decision threshold T , the authentication is complete, and the
subject is deemed to be authenticated. T refers to the minimum
confidence of the CNN required to accept a given input tensor.
A higher value of T will make it more difficult to mistakenly
accept negative-class BCG waveforms, but will also hinder the
acceptance of positive-class BCG waveforms.
The authentication step in our approach need not be a one-
shot event; it can be repeated over several w-second segments.
We use the variable s to denote the number of segments (hence
the number of authentication attempts) that were performed
during authentication. In our approach, if any one of the s
sequential segments is accepted, the wearer is authenticated.
Note that since between any two w-second segments there is
a w − 1-second overlap, a sequence of s segments will only
require s + w − 1 seconds to measure.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We now describe the dataset and metrics that we use
to validate our approach, along with our experiments that
establish the various parameters used in our approach.
A. Dataset
In order to validate our approach we collected data from
12 able-bodied volunteers. IRB approval was obtained for all
data collection. From each subject we collected 10 minutes of
accelerometer and gyroscope measurements using the Google
Glass.
Our goal with this project was to measure the longitudinal
effectiveness of our authentication approach. Consequently, we
collected three 10-minute sessions from our subjects over
approximately three months. During a session sitting, still
for 10 minutes can be tedious; therefore, we broke up the
10-minute session into five 2-minute intervals. Between each
interval subjects were given ample time to take a break and
readjust themselves. During the 2-minute intervals, we asked
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Fig. 2: Final CNN topology and the chosen parameters used in our subject-specific authentication model.
TABLE I: Dataset demographics
Set Avg. Age Std. Dev. Age ♂ ♀
Validation 32.83 13.13 4 8
External 28.50 10.91 7 3
All 30.86 12.09 12 10
the subjects to either focus on an eye-level sticky note stuck to
the wall nearby, or to close their eyes. Further, we specifically
asked the subjects not to focus on the screen of the Google
Glass display as we found it is uncomfortable for anyone to
do so for long periods of time. During any of the five 2-minute
intervals, if the subjects moved in anyway, the data collection
for that interval was stopped and repeated.
All but one of the 12 subjects provided us with three
sessions of data spread over 63 days. For every subject, the
time-difference between any two sessions was at least 10 days.
We refer to these 12 subjects as the validation set. In addition,
we also collected data from 10 other subjects, which we call
the external set. The data in the validation set are used to train
the models for authentication. As we are building subject-
specific models, we generate 12 models from the validation
set. In contrast, the people in the external set include subjects
from whom we only obtained one session (due to scheduling
reasons) or those subjects whose data was collected in the pilot
phase of the data collection. We use the external set for the
evaluation of the ability of the subject-specific authentication
models to reject data from subjects that it has never seen
before. Table I summarizes the demographics of our dataset.
B. Metrics
In order to evaluate the efficacy of our approach we use
the following core metrics: false acceptance rate (FAR), false
rejection rate (FRR), and equal error rate (EER). FAR is the
fraction of negatively labeled test BCG waveforms that were
misclassified as positive. FRR is the fraction of positively
labeled BCG waveforms that were misclassified as negative.
Similarly, true acceptance rate (TAR) is the fraction of posi-
tively labeled BCG waveforms that were classified as positive,
while true rejection rate (TRR) is the fraction of negatively
labeled BCG waveforms that were classified as negative. The
average of TAR and TRR provides us with accuracy. Finally,
TABLE II: Accuracy for different segment lengths (w)
segment length 1s 2s 3s 4s 5s
Accuracy (%) 89.79 94.81 97.55 96.51 98.53
equal error rate (EER) is the rate at which FAR and FRR
are equal. Even though we compute these metrics for every
subject in our dataset, we present summary statistics of these
metrics as an average over all subjects.
C. Parameter Selection
The data we use for all our parameter selection come from
the first session of the subjects in the validation set. In order
to tune our model parameters, we create 12 separate models,
one for each of the subjects in the validation set. We then train
the models using ∆E = 8 minutes of data, and tune using the
remaining 2 minutes of data. Consequently, each model has 8
minutes of data from one subject in its positive class, and 88
minutes (8 minutes × 11 subjects) from other subjects in the
validation set in the negative class. The remaining 24 minutes
(2 minutes × 12 subjects) of data is used to test each model
and tune its parameters based on the test results. All tests
are done with s = 1, i.e., with one-shot authentication using
one segment of movement data. In our approach there are
essentially two types of parameters that need to be decided:
the parameters of the CNN and the segment length (w).
Selecting the CNN’s parameters: As mentioned before, we
took a genetic algorithm-based method to find the parameters
of our CNN-based authentication model. We optimized over
a total of 10 traits that capture all the elements associated
with convolutional and dense layers in the network. We omit
the list of traits for clarity. Our algorithm first generates 20
CNNs, randomly selecting values from all possible traits and
training them the first four 2-minute intervals (which forms
∆E) of the first session of data collection and evaluating their
performance using the final 2 minutes of data in the first
session. We use the scoring function (FAR)2 + (FRR)2 to
evaluate each CNN. In each generation we select the best 25%
CNNs as the parents for the next generation. Additionally, we
select 3 CNNs at random from the bottom 75% as parents. As
such, the each generation has 8 parents. In order to replenish
the next generation back up to 20, 12 children are created. This
is done by selecting two of the parents at random from the
pool of 8, and for each trait, randomly selecting between the
two values held by the parents. A 15% mutation rate is applied
to the children in each generation. We ran this algorithm for
10 generations and selected the CNN with the overall best
score as our model (shown in Figure 2).
Choosing the segment length w: In order to determine
the length of segments (i.e, w seconds) of accelerometer
and gyroscope measurements, from which we obtain the
BCG waveforms, we evaluate values of w from 1 second
to 5 seconds in discrete steps using the data from the first
session, as described previously. For each model, we compute
the accuracy ((TAR+TRR)/2), and then average the accuracy
across all models. We found that the the accuracy increases
until w = 3 seconds and then flattens, as shown in Table II.
We therefore choose our segment length as w = 3 seconds.
V. EVALUATION
We now train a CNN classifier (parametrized with the the
values chosen above) as the authentication model for each
of the 12 subjects in our validation set. Subsequently, we
evaluate the efficacy of these models in realistic settings, by
using the yet-unseen samples of our dataset. This simulates the
actions of the primary adversary of our threat model; someone
who views a subject (i.e., victim) authenticating and then
tries to mimic their head movements in order to authenticate
successfully. As the victim does not make any head movement
or gestures during authentication, the adversary has nothing to
copy and is reduced to using their own head movements to try
to authenticate.
A. Evaluation Data Categories
We evaluate our approach based on three categories of
data from the dataset. (1) Positive Validation: Here, we test
each subject’s model with BCG waveforms derived from
the subject’s own yet-unseen (i.e., not used for training2)
segments. We use these positive-class BCG waveforms to
compute the TAR (referred to as Validation TAR) of our
authentication approach. (2) Negative Validation : Similarly,
we also test the BCG waveforms from rest of the segments
in the validation set, i.e., those belonging to the other 11
users. The TRR (referred to as Validation TRR), thus derived,
demonstrates how well the model can prevent other subjects
in the validation set from impersonating a particular subject.
These BCG waveforms do not possess any temporal meaning
with respect to the model being evaluated and are treated as
one large set. (3) Negative External: Finally the external set
is used to generate a second TRR (referred to as External
TRR), which demonstrates that our models have not overfit
and are equally capable of denying entry to subjects whose
data they have never seen in any form. Similar to (2), these
BCG waveforms also do not possess any temporal meaning
with respect to the model being evaluated.
2This include segments from the final 2 minutes of data in session 1 along
with segments from 10 minutes of data from sessions 2 and 3.
Note that we have used the last 2 minutes of data from the
subjects in the validation set to select the CNN parameters
and choose the appropriate segment length. We maintain that
this will not affect the correctness of our results because at
no point are these last 2 minutes of data used in the actual
training of models.
B. Performance Analysis
Figure 3 shows the ROC curves for the 12 trained models,
for multiple values of s, i.e., authentication attempts. The
curves are produced by varying T , the decision threshold that
provides the lower bound of the confidence level of the CNN.
Here, TAR = Validation TAR, and FAR = {(1−Validation
TRR) + (1−External TRR)}/2. We generate a total of three
ROC graphs, one for each data collection session. It can be
seen that, overall, our approach performs well. In session 1,
the ROC curves show that the authentication models are very
accurate with area-under-the-curve (AUC) values greater than
0.99, irrespective of the number of authentication attempts. It
is easy to see that the greater the number of authentication
attempts, the higher the overall accuracy (i.e., s = 7 always
outperforms s = 1). The accuracy of the authentication models
drops in sessions 2 and 3. The performance drop between
sessions 2 and 3 is, however, minimal as denoted by the AUC
values. Since our segments are overlapped when s = 7, it
only requires s + w − 1 seconds (i.e., 9 seconds) of sensor
measurements.
The EER values for a given number of authentication
attempts (i.e., value of s ) is the point in Figure 3 where it’s
ROC curve meets the top left and bottom right diagonal (not
shown in the figures) of the graph. Not surprisingly, the EER
value occurs at different decision thresholds T . Figure 4 shows
the EER values and its evolution over time. The magnitude of
the EER value again shows the efficacy of our approach. For
s = 1, EER value is below 5% in session 1, and then increases
to around 13% in sessions 2 and 3. Again higher values of s
produce lower EER values.
Figure 5 shows how the Validation TAR, Validation TRR,
and External TRR vary for our 12 subjects over the three
sessions when the models are set to the decision threshold
T where we achieve EER. It can be seen that for session 1,
the box plots are very tight for all s. However, as we move
to sessions 2 and 3, we vary the threshold T such that we
remain at the EER. This ensures that our TAR does not drop
too precipitously, while still keeping a reasonably high TRR.
The External TRR has a higher spread than Validation TRR,
however, the medians of both are still very similar to each
other. Again, as the number of authentication attempts (s)
increase, the accuracy increases overall as seen from the lower
spread of the box plots.
These results show the viability of using BCG, collected
using head-mounted wearable devices, for authentication.
C. Performance for Individuals with Motor Disabilities
We also deployed our authentication approach on a dataset
where the subjects had severe motor disabilities. Such indi-
(a) Session 1 (b) Session 2 (c) Session 3
Fig. 3: For each session, we generate ROC curves for each value of s (authentication attempts) by varying T (decision
threshold). For visual clarity the x and y axis of the graphs have been shortened. The area-under-the-curve (AUC)
values indicate the full extent of the performance of the models for various values of s.
Fig. 4: For each ROC curve, we isolate the EER. As
expected, we see a degradation in EER as time between
the training and authentication increases.
viduals cannot independently authenticate to their computing
devices because traditional authentication approaches, like
passwords, were not designed for such populations, and there-
fore, are extremely difficult to use [15]. The passive nature of
our approach has the potential to allow individuals with motor
disabilities to authenticate to their devices with minimal effort
and therefore increase their independence in using modern
computing devices.
We collected a separate dataset with 6 subjects (average
age of 40 (11.06 stdev), 3 female, 3 male) with non-spastic
cerebral palsy for this portion of the work. We obtained the
requisite IRB approval and collaborated with a local non-profit
organization to obtain the data. Due to scheduling difficulties,
we collected two sessions of data from every subject but one.
Further, the second session was conducted after 15 days for
two subjects and 57 days for the other three, after the initial
session.
Once again, we created subject-specific authentication mod-
els and repeated the evaluation process described in Section
V for each of these six subjects. All the parameters for
our authentication model were identical to those described in
Section IV. We evaluated these models using the external set
of completely unseen data mentioned in Section IV-A, along
with Validation Positive and Validation Negative categories, as
described in Section V-A, created using the data from these
six subjects.
Figure 6 shows the EER results for this dataset over the two
sessions. Overall, we observe a degradation in performance
compared to the larger dataset. The worst case EER is 11.2%
immediately after training and 21.6% after around 2 months,
again both for s = 1. We attribute this to a number of factors:
(1) we observed that this group had increased difficulty in
maintaining a motionless posture, given that their condition
often affects their head muscles as well, (2) many of them
were assisted by medical devices that would, on occasion,
generate vibrational noise, and (3) we did not tune the CNN
for this particular population. That being said, note that for
s = 7 the EER values were at least 3-4% lower and we suspect
further increasing s and tuning the CNN would lower the EER
even more. Given the poor state of authentication solutions
for people with motor disability we view these results as a
promising first step.
VI. DISCUSSION
The results demonstrate the potential of our approach. How-
ever, this work has some limitations, which plan to address in
the future. These include:
Compensating for various types of artifacts. Motion arti-
facts are a big problem with extracting physiological responses
from movement data [8]. Therefore, we need strategies to
compensate for noise induced in the signal from the motion of
the user. Particularly: (1) when used in locations with heavy
foot traffic and (2) when used while the user performs different
activities (e.g., standing, walking etc.).
Potential implementation issues. This paper only describes
an analysis of our authentication approach, not its implemen-
tation. Ideally, we want the authentication decision to be made
(a) s = 1 (b) s = 3
(c) s = 5 (d) s = 7
Fig. 5: Validation TAR, Validation TRR and External TRR for values of s (authentication attempts) between 1 and 7,
by using optimal values of T over the three sessions. Note, the y-axis of the graph does not start at the origin.
Fig. 6: EER calculated from models trained with data from
subjects with motor disabilities.
locally on the head-mounted wearable device, to minimize the
security risks of off-loading the authentication decision. Im-
plementing our approach on head-mounted wearable devices
needs to be explored further.
Effects of fatigue and physical activity: In our current
dataset the subjects were alert during all data collection ses-
sions. However, it has been shown that factors such as fatigue
or recent physical activity, effect an individual’s physiology,
movements, and posture [12]. At this time it is not clear how
well our approach works when authenticating individuals who
are fatigued, under the weather, or have engaged in recent
physical activity.
Model re-training schedule. As physiological responses
from subjects change over time, we see that our authentication
accuracy drops in sessions 2 and 3. Adjusting the decision
threshold will help to reduce authentication errors only to
some extent. At some point we have to retrain the models to
capture the current physiology of the individual. Approaches
are required to determine when to retrain the authentication
models, such that the overall drop in authentication accuracy
of the models is balanced with the inconvenience of taking the
system offline.
VII. RELATED WORK
Ballistocardiography has been tried for authentication pur-
poses [7], [9], [16]. In [7], [16], ballistocardiography was
used on movement data collected from the person’s torso,
which makes it substantially easier to accurately detect the
person’s cardiac properties. The nature of ballistocardiography
precludes us from using these results because as we move
away from the heart, the noise in the derived BCG waveform
increases dramatically [9]. This is borne out by the fact that
the original attempt to identify a subject based on BCG signals
measured using hand-worn movement sensors, produced only
a 66% accuracy rate [9].
Authentication approaches have been previously explored in
the context of SEW devices as well. In [10], the authors use the
notion of head movement in response to a specific song as a
signature for authentication. The head movements used by this
system are, however, very simple and can be easily spoofed
by an adversary. In [14], the authors induce white noise into
the subject’s skull, the response to which is then picked up to
determine who is wearing the device. This is a better solution
in terms of spoofing resistance, but it requires the use of bone
conductance speakers, which are something that not all SEW
devices possess. This approach requires around 23 seconds
of inducing noise before it can identify the subject, which is
too slow to be practical. Further, the use of white-noise for
authentication has been found to be uncomfortable to some
subjects, as noted by the authors. In [11], the authors present
an approach for user identification in SEW devices, which uses
the blinking and head movement pattern of the subject while
they watch a short video on the device’s screen. However this
approach requires 34 seconds to identify the user, presenting
an obvious temporal barrier to usefulness.
Furthermore, none of the existing work using ballistocardio-
graphy for authentication or SEW-device authentication has
tested their models longitudinally, something we explicitly
address in this work.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have demonstrated a new authentica-
tion approach using ballistocardiogram (BCG) collected from
head-worn wearables. We use BCG waveforms derived from
accelerometer and gyroscope sensor measurements in a Smart
Eyewear device, and achieved an EER of ∼4% immediately
after training, and ∼13% after almost 60 days of training. Ad-
ditionally, we demonstrated that our approach holds promise
as a new authentication option for individuals with motor
disabilities.
In the immediate future we plan to extend this work in
several directions including: (1) studying the use of BCG-
based authentication for a larger population of people with
motor disabilities, (2) making the approach tolerant to the pres-
ence environmental noise (e.g., foot traffic), (3) evaluating the
consequences of recent physical activity on our authentication
accuracy, and (4) implementing our approach on the SEW
device.
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